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Sector Participation in Labour Supply Models: Preferences or rationing?
by
Menno Pradhan.
In this paper we propose a model that allows to test for labour market segmentation
between the formal and informal sector in a developing country on the basis of
cross-section data. Tests of labour market segmentation are usually based on a
comparison of observed wages in two sectors. Wage differences for identical
workers in different sectors can be attributed to differences in preferences attached
to participation in a sector and to restrictions in mobility between sectors. While
the latter can be regarded as an indicator of "true" labour market segmentation,
compensating wage differentials resulting from preferences would remain existent,
even in the absence of rationing. So far, the applied tests have not been able to
dixlinl;uixh Ix:twccn thcsc two cflccls. The prolxisui modcl overcomes this
weakness by incorporating infonnation on search, including on the job search, and
discouragement to identify rationed individuals. The proposed model exploits the
specific features of urban labour markets in developing countries, in particular the
existence of a competitive informal sector. The model is estimated on data from the
1989 Bolivian household survey by means of smooth simulated maximum
likelihcxxi. The estimates show that the degree of labour market segmentation
dil~l'ers slrongly ovcr educational groups.
Tilburg University, P.O. box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands.3
l.introduction
Thc dual labour market approach is often used to analyze urban labour markets in
developing countries (see for examples: Todaro (1989, p. 268), Fields (1989)). In
this approach the labour market consists of two sectors: First, a regulated,
"formal" sector comprising the public sector and large firms subject to legal
regulations. Jobs in this sector typically involve a contract and follow more
institutionalized, rigid, wage setting procedures. Second, an unregulated,
"informal" sector consisting of small firms with low capital investments, usually
olx~raling in the service sector or engaged in small scale production. ln the dual
labour market approach, labour mobility between the two sectors is restricted.
Formal sector jobs are rationed as a result of minimum wage legislation andlor
union settlements governing employment conditions. The informal sector is a free
entry sector.
Empirical studies of the dual labour market approach have focused on testing for
labour market segmentation. In general the methodology is as follows: Wages (or
hourly earnings) of workers with a similar background are compared for both
sectors. It is assumed that in selecting the preferred sector the potential workers
consider the wage offers only. In the absence of rationing every individual would
enter the sector offering the highest wage and, in equilibrium, wage offers would
equalize. In the presence of rationing, however, some workers desiring a formal
sector job (because the wage offer is higher) may not be able to obtain one and end
up working in the infonnal sector. Thus, labour market segmentation implies that
there are identical workers with different earnings in the two sectors. This can be
empirically tested. Of course, as Heckman and Hotz (1986) point out, the estimated
wage equations have to be corrected for the endogeneity of the selection into
sectors. Empirical studies for developing countries include Gindling (1991) for
Costa Rica and Magnac (1992) for Colombia. For developed countries a similar
methodology has been developed by Dickens and Lang (1985). See also Hartog and
Oosterbeek (1989) for a comparison between public private sector wages and
Dickens and Lang (1992) for a survey of segmentation theory and evidence.
A shortcoming of the applied tests for labour market segmentation is that they have
not been able to make a distinction between wage differentials resulting from
individual preferences concerning non-wage job characteristics and those resulting
from restrictions in mobility between sectors. While the latter can be regarded as
an indicator of "true" labour market segmentation, compensating wage
differentials resulting from preferences would remain existent, even in the absence
of rationing. Compensating wage differentials follow from non-monetary returns to
the job such as health insurance, irtility associated with the workplace or job
security. Also pure preferences, for example following from the social status
attached to participation in a particular sector, could cause a wage differential
between sectors. Gindling ( 1991) circumvented this problem by comparing wages4
within narrowly detined occupational groups, assuming that within these groups the
non-monetary returns are equal across sectors.
In this paper we will propose a model that allows to test for labour market
segmentation between the formal and ínformal sector in a developing country on
the basis of cross-sectional data. The proposed test overcomes the shortcomings
that were discussed in the previous paragraph. The model exploits the specific
features of urban labour markets in developing countries, in particular the existence
of a cornpetitive informal sector. The model incorporates information on search,
including on the job search, to identify rationed individuals. The organization of
the paper is as follows: In section 2 we discuss the underlying assumptions of the
model. Especially the treatment of information on search and discouragement is a
novelty of the model. On the basis of these assumptions we derive in section 3 a
formal nuxlel of labour supply that deals simultaneously with wages, sector
prclcraiccs and rationing. Section 4 describes the data and looks for empirical
evidence of rationing by means of descriptive statistics. In section 5 the estimation
strategy for the fonnal model is discussed. In section 6 the estimated ccefficients
are presented, a test for labour market segmentation is derived and some
simulations are presented that could be interesting from a policy point of view.
Section 7, finally, concludes.
2 Rationing search und discouraEed workers
A labour supply model in which individuals face no entry barriers for any of the
sectors typically comprises two sections: a sector selection section and a wage
detennination section. In the sector selection section, the sector in which the
individual decides to participate is explained. In a Heckman (1974) type model the
choice would be between working and not working, but in principle more than two
sectors can be allowed for. Sector choice is explained by the wage offers in each
sector (for non-participation the value of home production) and individual
preferences associated with participation in a sector. In the wage determination
section wage offers in each sector are related to individual characteristics and local
labour market conditions. The wage equations have to be estimated jointly with the
sector selection section because of non-random selection into sectors. For the
Bolivian setting, the country of focus in this paper, models of this kind were
analyced in 1'radhan and van Scest (1992). In this paper the sector selection section
will be replaced by a sector preference section and a rationing section.
We want to develop a labour supply model that explicitly considers rationing and
that can be estimated on cross-sectional household survey data stemming from
urban areas in a developing country. To this end, some assumptions considering
the sectors and the treatment of rationing have to be made. These are:
-The informal sector is a competitive, free entry sector.
-Rationing is indicated by search or discouragement.5
The first assumption is rather standard. It is often used as a way to define the
informal sector. It is also mentioned in a recent review of the informal sector
studies by the OECD (Lubell 1990). Firms operating in the informal sector are
small and require low capital investments. Anyone wishing to work in the informal
sector can do so immediately. As a consequence, all rationing takes place for
fonnal sector jobs only.
The second assumption requires more discussion. If an individual searches, this
indicates that he (or she) is not content with his (or her) present situation. If the
individual were not rationed he (or she) would change to the preferred situation.
Search indicates that the person is not able to do so immediately and is rationed.
There may, however, be individuals who are rationed but do not search. They may
have searched in the past but were unsuccessful in their quest. In our analysis we
treat these discouraged persons (those who report not to be searching for work
because no work is available) identical to the searchers. Finally, it is also possible
that an individual searches but is not rationed. In that case the individual just wants
to detennine his or her market value by looking what is available. The model dces
not allow for this: The individual is assumed to have perfect information on
potential earnings in all sectors.
One way to interpret discouragement is the presence of search costs: Some people
will not search because the costs of search exceed the expected gains. These people
are therefore rationed in the sense that their long run preferred status is different
from the actual state, but they do not search. By treating them as rationed, search
costs do not play a role. The model dces thus not explain the search-no search
decision, but only the preferred state, ignoring search costs. In principle, the
distinction between discouraged and searching individuals could be useful to
identify search costs but, given the nature of the cross section data, without
information on how long it takes to find a job, this approach dces not seem to be
feasible. In the sequel, the term searchers will be used for both searching and
discouraged individuals.
Under the assumptions stated above rationing takes place for formal sector jobs
only and individuals rationed for formal sector jobs are identified by their search
activity or because they are discouraged. The sector in which an individual is
observed is influenced by wage offers, preferences and rationing. As yet, the
model dces not allow for individuals to search while they are working in the formal
seclor. Since they are working in the formal seetor they eannot be rationed for this
seclor at thc samc time. Such observations, however, do appear in the dataset. To
allow for this situation we introduce two types of formal sector jobs: "good" and
"bad" jobs. Good jobs have the advantage over "bad" jobs in that they offer a
higher wage. In other respects, such as the non-monetary returns, the two type of6
jobs are assumed to be the same'. Thus, any individual will always prefer a
"good" formal sector job to a"bad" one. Those who work in the formal sector and
search are assumed to have a"bad" formal sector job attd to be looking for a
"gocxl" one. Those who do not search have a"good" formal sector job. Search or
discottragement thus identifies the difference between "good" and "bad" in the data.
In this setting we assume that rationing takes place for "good" formal sector jobs
only. The nature of the (cross section) data dces not allow for a continuum of bad-
good job offers.
The model described above allows us to specify for each individual the preferred
sector, the actual sector and whether the individual is rationed or not.
Systematically all the possible cases are given in table 1. Entry into the "good"
fortnal sector is rationed, all other sectors are assumed to operate competitively.
Non-workers, by definition, include both voluntary and involuntary unemployed.
For formal and informal sector workers we define search as looking for another job
replacing the current one. As hours of work are not considered, those individuals
who report to be looking for additional work are categorized as non-searchers. For
non-participants and workers in the informal sector that do not search we know that
their actttal stattts is the preferred one. For them we do not know whether they are
rationed for "good" formal sector jobs. They can directly enter into the preferred
sector and rationing for the formal sector is irrelevant to their actual status.
Table I. Relationship between observed, preferred sector and rationing
- ()MerveJ Proferr~l Actuxl
S~x tor ~run.hing S~tor Snctor Rationr.d
formal ~ tor yns (good) formal lxul formal yrs
no (good) formal good fortnal no
informal sextor y~ (gcwd) formal informal yes
no informal informal '?
non-Participation y~ (gocx!) formal non-participation yrs
no non-participation non-participation ?
Identitication of the effects of preferences versus rationing is achieved through
incorporation of search information in the model. The ccefficients in the rationing
section are identified on the basis of the search information of formal sector
workers. The sector participation decision of non-searchers in combination with
their observed wages identify the coefficients in the preference section of the
'In principle, the m~xlel can be adjusted tu alluw fur the utility uf "gaxl" and "bad" forma)
juhs to Jiffer with taste shifters as well. However, since txith "gaxl" and "bad" jobs are similar in
the sense that they are Mith salaried wurk we du not allow for this in the estimation. Only the
Jifference in nun-munetary returns hetween the formal and informal sector is analyzed.model. Only the difference in preferences attached to participation in the informal
versus non-participation and participation in the formal versus non-participation can
be identified. The difference in the wage offer function between good and bad
formal sector jobs is identified on the basis of the observed wages of searchers and
non-searchers in the formal sector and on the assumption that informal sector
searchers prefer a good formal sector job to their current one while this is not the
case for a bad formal sector job.
3. The Model
In the model three possible labour markets statuses are distinguished. These are:
(I) work in thc formal sector (gocxl and bad jobs), (2) work in the informal sector
and, (3) non-participation. The latter includes home production. The only
difference between "good" and "bad" formal sector jobs is that a bad formal sector
job offers a lower wage. In other respects, such as the non-monetary returns to the
job, the two types of jobs are identical. Bad formal sector jobs can be regarded as
underpaid. Any individual will prefer a"good" formal sector job to a"bad" formal
sector job.
Wa~e offers. Wage offers in the formal and informal sector are a function of
individual specific variables and regional specific variables describing the local
labour market conditions. In the formal sector two wage offers exist, a"good" and
a"bad" one. They differ in that the wage offer for the "good" one is higher than
for the "bad" one. We start by formulating the "good" formal sector wage. In the
informal zcclor (j-2) no distinction tx~lwecn gocxl and bad exists. The potential
hourly wage in sector j is modelled as
s w;~ - X;~~ t ~y j-1,2 (t)
with
X; - a vector of explanatory variables influencing returns
n;~ - an error term
Bad formal sector jobs offer a lower wage than good formal sector jobs. This is
imposed in the estimation by including an exponential term on the difference in the
wage offer between "good" and "bad" fonnal sector jobs. The difference in the
wage offer is made dependent on individual characteristics and local Iabour market
conditions. The potential hourly wage for a"bad" formal sector job equals
b w;l - w;a - exp(X;S) (2)
with
w;,x - wage offer of a"good" formal sector job
w;;' - wage offer of a"bad" formal sector job8
Preferences. Preferences are modelled using a latent variable structure. Each
individual prefers the sector yielding the highest utility. The utility of participation
in sector j is related to the wage offer and non-monetary returns in that sector.
Non-monetary returns relate to any utility that the individual may attach to
participation in a sector besides the wage offer. For example, a head of the
household responsible for a large family may prefer to work in the formal sector
because it offers additional job security.
The utility of individual i associated with sector j equals
U~~b - Z~Ói t wii b} Ey
(3)
with
i - subscript denoting the individual
j - subscript denoting the sector with
- I: fonnal sector ("good" and "bad" jobs)
- 2 : informal sector
- 3 : non-participation
U;~ - utility of individual i in sector j
Z; - a vector of explanatory variables influencing preferences for sectors
w~R~ - a(good or bad) wage offer to individual i in sector j
e;~ - an error term
Z; contains individual and household specific variables. Characteristics of the
observed job are not included as they are not constant across sectors. The potential
hourly earnings in the informal sector are unique for each individual (no distinction
between "good" or "bad"). Earnings stemming from both sectors are equally
valued in the utility function. The ccefficient on the wage is set to one. As a result
the ZS terms can be interpreted as the non-monetary returns of participation
measured in monetary terms. Normalization requires one of the utilities to be set to
zero. We choose U;s, the utility of non-participation. This implies that we do not
have to be concerned about the unobserved w;,, the value of home production.
Rationina.
Rationing for "good" formal sector jobs is assumed to be a discrete zerolone
variable and to depend on individual and labour market characteristics influencing
the demand for formal sector labour. We model the probability that an individual is
rationed by9
R~ - Rta t E,; ~~ R~ ~ 0 if rationtd,
~ 0 if not rationed
(4)
with
R;' - a latent variable indicating whether individual i is rationed
R; - Explanatory variables influencing ratíoning
E',; - an error term, representing "luck" in entering into the good formal sector
Error structure
E„E,,rt„n, and Er are assumed to be i.i.d. and multivariate normal with mean zero
and covariance matrix E.
(E~l ~O~ O D U U ~
E2 OiOUO






Correlation hetwexn the preference section and [he wage determination section of
the nuxlel enters through the inclusion of wages into the utility equation. The
correlation between wages and rationing is included directly in the covariance
matrix. The correlation between the errors of the wage equation in the formal and
informal scctor is not idcntificd Ix;causc wc obscrve an individual working in at
most one sector. The variances in the preference section equations (o, and a) can
be identified because we normalize the ccefficient of the wage in the indirect utility
function to one. The wage offers can be included in the RHS of the preference
equations because of exclusion restrictions in Z and X. Rationing is modelled in a
probit type specification and therefore the variance of E; is normalized. The errors
in the rationing equation and the preference section equations are assumed
independent. However, some correlation is introduced indirectly as omitted
variables appearing in the wage offer equations are allowed to influence both the
probability of rationing as well as the indirect utility of participation in sectors.
4. Data
The research will be based on data of the second round of the Bolivian householdlo
survey (Enquesta lntergrada de Hogares), drawn in 1989. The survey uses a
random sample of the urban population and is administered yearly by the Bolivian
National Bureau of Statistics (Instituto Nacional de Estadistica) with technical
assistance of the World Bank. The survey ís a repeated cross-section. The 1989
survey covers 7264 households in 8 urban centers. Household survey data, in
contrast to firm level data, are particularly appropriate for measuring activity in the
informal sector since they are drawn from the entire urban population. Firm level
data often do not include non-listed firms (micro-enterprises), of which the bulk of
the informal sector consists. The survey collects a measure for household
consumption and, for every family member separately, detailed information on
labour supply, earnings, education, health, fertility and migration. The labour
section of the survey is extensive. It provides information on occupation, earnings,
hours worked and search behaviour.
Following Magnac (1991), our definition of formality is based on the information
on the worker's status and household business related, assets. Wage workers and
independent professionals are classified as formal. Self-employed workers are
classified as fonnal sector workers if their household business assets are greater
than IS.00(1 bolivianos (fl- uS Si00). Business assets include property of land, car
for business use and telephone. The other self-employed (about 95 percent) are
categorized as infonnal sector workers. Others, that is employers, home and family
workers, are left unclassified and are not included in the analysis. For them it is
not possible to obtain a proper measure of their earnings. See Pradhan and van
Scest (1992) for details on the implications of the choice of definition for the
infonnal sector.
"I'he rescarch fix;uses on labour supply behaviour of individuals between l9 a~x1 65
years of age. Table 2 provides summary statistics for the individuals that were
included in the estimation. Individuals who cannot be considered potential workers
because of health or education reasons are excluded from the analysis. The decision
to go to school is thus assumed to be taken prior and independent from the labour
supply decision. A description of all variables that are used in this paper is
included in appendix 1. In general, we find that formal sector workers have a
higher education than infonnal sector workers. Ethnic minorities are
overrepresented in the informal sector. Ethnic groups are identified in the data
trough the language they report to speak: If they regularly speak another language
than Spanish they are classified as an ethnic minority. On average, hourly earnings
are higher in the formal sector than in the informal sector. Average savings are
higher in the informal sector (significant for females, not for males) which
corresponds to the precautionary savings motive predicting that savings will be the
highest in the sector in which earnings are most volatile.II
Table 2. Descriptive statistics
(means and sample fractions; standard deviations in parentheses)
rnsk r~~n.t~
nnr na-
fnnnal inrorm working (omxl infonn worlcing
highW I-vcl or oducetwm a0airr~d:
h~uiclm.nc 0.'1 0.35 0.26 0.11 0.40 0.29
inlcr 0.14 0.19 0.13 0.06 0.13 0.15
nw:din 0.~9 0.30 0.33 0.2't 0.20 0.29
midra:h 0.04 0.03 O.OS 0.09 0.03 0.05
higMkh 0.03 0.Q'' 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.01
nnnrral 0.06 0.01 0.0' 0.26 0.0? 0.03
univcnity 0.19 0.07 0.16 0.17 0.03 0.05
~whcr 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.16 0.13
merrial 0.79 0.84 0.59 0.56 0.71 0.60
ethnic 0.30 0.39 0.33 0.~0 0.46 O.:i4
e).,; 36.1 39.5 38.7 34.0 39.3 36.6
sctivc w:urehinF 1~) 6.3 6.6 33.9 2.0 3.3 8.8
diw:~~urnE~d (7F) IJ.4 ??.7 10.9 11.9 14.7 ?.4
MN~rly u~min~x '.SO ~.38 ~.03 1.94
1)~rinwry uotivity'1 14.71 14.01 (~.G) (4.41
iwt Jinwrvin~~.' B.NI t3.1 ]7?.8 100.34 dB.G I41.5
110151 18901 (634) (I~8) (834) fI065)
twmYx:r ul' uhw:rvntuuw 3703 1763 681 1494 1917 388?
With respect to search activity the pattern is very different for males and females.
For Inales, Inost of the search takes place in the non-workers group. 53 percent of
Inales who do not work are involttntary unemployed. For females, the amount of
search is Inuch lower for non-participants. Staying at home is in most of the cases
the preferred status. For both males and females, on the job search activity is
higher in the infonnal sector than in the formal. This suggests that the informal
sector Inay function as a buffer, for those who seek a good job in the fot~rrtal
sector. Getting out of this buffer sector is not that easy, however. The percentage
of discouraged searchers is the highest in the informal sector. This high rate of
discouragetnent could be caused by high costs of on the job search in the informal
'in Bolivianos; At the time uf the survey I Bolivianu was worth appruximately U.37 U.S.
dollar. Taxes and premiums are relatively luw in Bolivia. Most of government revenues are
collr,~teil through wnsumption be,eed tax~.
`rhe zurvey dues wllect intirrmatiun on the se~:ondary activity. However, the information for
the secunJ activity is not cullected with the same Jetail as tirr the tirst. We Ju not ohserve a great
numher uf individuals participating in Mrth secturs. In the data~et 2.5 96 percent of the males and
I 96 uf the femal~ participated turth in the tirrmal and informal sei.Kor. In this study infiirmation
on secunJary activitiu~ is ignureJ.
'household level variable JetineJ a.e tutal huusehold uinsumption minus total household lattnur
incume. See Pradhan end van Suest (1992) firr details.12
sector or by an adverse selection andlor stigma effect. In the estimation active
searchers and discouraged workers are treated identically. In our model, formal
sector workers are assumed to be searching because they have an underpaid, "bad",
job. To get a rough idea whether this is indeed the case we ran a log hourly wage
regression for all formal sector workers including a dummy for search activity in
the set of explanatory variables. For both males and females, the estimated
coefficient came out negative, as expected. For males the estimated coefficient
was -0.23 with a t statistic of -7.4 and for females -0.13 with a t-statistic of -2.53.
This result is also found for developed countries (See Devine and Kiefer, p238).
5. Estimation method
Estimation of the model is achieved by smooth simulated maximum likelihood
(SSML). Evaluation of the likelihcxxl function involves the computation of multiple
integrals. Since these integrals are of a dimension higher than two, numerical
integration requires an infeasible amount of computer time. Lerman and Manski
(19R I) proposed a frequency simulator to approximate the probabilities that appear
in the likelihood function. Their simulator involves taking multiple draws from the
distribution of the error tenns. It has the disadvantage that a large number of draws
is needed to obtain precise estimates. Moreover, the simulated likelihood function
is not a smooth function of the unknown parameters. Standard optimization routines
(Newton Raphson e.g.), which require differentiability of the approximated
likelihood cannot be used. We follow a method that is similar to that proposed by
Stern (1992). The resulting simulated likelihood function is a smooth function of
the unknown parameters of the model. The estimates obtained by maximizing the
simulated log likelihood function are consistent if the number of draws per
observation tends to infinity with the number of observations. Moreover, provided
that draws for different individuals are independent, ML and SSML will be
asymptotically equivalent as HI,~N--~oo, where H is the number of draws and N is
the number of observations (cf. Gourieroux and Monfort, 1990)
Define B-(ó„b„~B„Qz,r,o~). The likelihood function can be written as
n
L - jj Pr[c,,Lv,,x;,e)~u~c~(v;,x;,e)Ix,,Z;l f,(t;lx,) (~
;-t
with
'Belause uf the enJugeneity uf the search Jummy this regr~sion is mit vatiJ in the framework
a.e a whole. The results are given ti~r descriptive puc7xises unty. However, the signiticance of the
results Jues not chenge if one instruments ti~r search (Heckman 1978) using teste shifters as
instruments. The ~timatexl uiet7icient on the predicted probability of search remains negative. For




y;,X;- vectors containing dependent and independent variables
The contribution to the likelihood function of one individual can be written as a
conditional probability times a density. The calculation of the conditional
probability involves the evaluation of multiple integrals. Given t3, y; and X,., the
value of (;. can be calculated. The transformed error terms, ~ and (á ~~j , follow a
normal distribution N(O,B~EB~') and N(~,ft) with p-A~EB~'(B~EB~')-'~ and
iJ-A~EA~'-A~EB~'(B~EB~')-'B~EA~'. The specification of the matrices A~ and B~ and
the functions c,~ and c,; depend on the regime (j) the individual is in. For example,
in the case the individual is working in the informal sector and simultaneously
looking for a job, A, B, c, and c, are defined by
-1 1 -1 0 0
A- 0-1 0 0 0 B-[000 1 0]
0 0 0 0 -1
ci- (g)
In this example, ~;-rl;, equals
(9)
Z~-w~i-X~az
The SSML estimator obtains an unbiased estimate of the probability in (6) by
means of simulation. The idea is to decompose u into two components, each
normally distributed. The first is chosen such that it has a relatively simple
covariance structure. The other is simulated. Let






The Probability in (6) can now be written as
Pr[c,`u`cz~X,C] -Pr[c, -uz~u~~cz-uz ~X,Z]




where the suhscript i is suppressed. This is simulated by14
1 ~ Pr(c~ -uy~ui~c2-u~ ~X,Z,uy)
H k-~
(12)
where the u,s are drawn independently from ,J~u, ~ X, ~), the conditional density of
u,, with H replications.
In the decomposition of u we exploit the restrictions on the covariance matrix E.
The decomposition varies with the regime the individual is in. We include in u, n,
andlor n, if these are included in u. In the example stated above u,-[~„0,0]' and
~ry, ~ X, ~- N(O,a;). ~ dces not enter here because the ercors in the two wage
cyuations arc assumed indclx;ndent. The distrihution of (u,~X,~,ujt) is nonnal
N(ur,S2) with pr-AEB'(B~:B')'(j' u~)' and it-AF.A'-AEB'(BEB')'BF.A'. A and B
are defined as
-1 1 0 0 0
A- 0-1 00 0 B-




In Stern (1992) the ercor tenns u, and u, are assumed independent and the
covariance matrix of u, is diagonal. In our method the error terms are dependent
and we work with conditional distributions. The covariance structure of u, includes
one non-zero covariance element. Computation of the probability remains feasible
as this involves at most evaluating a bivariate cumulative probability. In the cases
where it is unknown whether the individual is rationed, the contribution to the
likelihood is calculated without simulation.
6. Estimation Results
The estimated ccefficients are obtained choosing the number of draws, H, equal to
i0. The draws are different and independent for each observation. We
cxlx;rim~~ntcd wilh taking dilfcrcnt nundx~rs uf draws. A changc from I(1 tu 30
draws made only a small difference in the estimation results. The reported
estimates should thus be close to the exact ML estimates. The estimated
coefficients are reported in tables AI to A4 in the appendix. Below we will discuss
the results.
Thr c~s~imatrd c~Ka7iricnts for the prcference section of the moctel are presented in
table AI. The presence of other prime age individuals (PRIME) in the household
significantly reduces the utility of working for both males and females. The effect
is the strongest for males. The presence of young children (YOUNG) significantly
reduces the preference of working for females. For males, formal sector preference
increases. The model allows for the effect of being married to be different for
HIS
different age groups. In table 3 we report the partial derivatives of the preferred
sector probability with respect to MARRIED for different age groups and sexes.
For males, for every age group MARRIED has a positive effect on the probability
of working. This effect diminishes as the individual gets older. For females the
effect is opposite, MARRIED increases the probability that non-participation is the
preferred sector. Especially when females approach 30, being married drives them
out of formal employment into non-participation.
Table 3. Partial effect of marriage on the probabilities for preferced sectors
(percentages, calculated at mean values)
agc
malas femalts
20 30 40 20 30 40
li~rm:d 3.54 2.2R 2.13 -5.54 -24.1i -30.8
infurmal 2.40 4.92 -0.09 -0.61 -5.76 -3.50
not working -5.94 -7.20 -2.04 6.15 30.52 34.32
The preference section of the model includes a measure of per capita net
dissavings. In a life cycle framework, two stage budgeting implies that the
houschold lirst dccidcs ulNm Ihc intertempural allcx;ation of consumption and, in
the second stage, decides on the allocation of consumption between goods and
leisure (Cf., e.g., Blundell and Watker, 1986). Net dissavings is obtained by
sublracting tlte total household expenditures from the total household earnings and
should, according to the theory, be uncorrelated with the error terms in the
preference section of the model. Net savings may, however, very well be
endogenous to the labour supply decision as a result of unobserved heterogeneity.
We add a reduced form eyuation for net dissavings to account for this potential
endogeneity (see Pradhan and van Scest 1992). The inclusion of non-labour income
into the instntmenting equation guarantees identification. The residual from the
instrumenting equation (PRED ERROR) is included as an explanatory variable in
Z." If net dissavings is exogenous, the ccefficient on the predicted ercor term of
the instntmenting equation would be insignificant. For both males and females the
effect of net dissaving decreases the probability of working. The hypothesis that net
dissavings can be treated as exogenous is rejected for both sexes.
The estimated ccefficients on the ZS term in the preference equations can be used
to get an idea of how the non-monetary returns compare in the formal and infotTttal
'The stanJarJ errurs of the ML estimates shi~ulJ he corrected for the errur due to replacing
the parameters uf the instrumenting equation in the currection term by their estimates. Previous
experience in which we useJ the same instrumenting equation showecl that the eff~x;t of the
ci~rrectiun is yuite small (see PraJhan anJ van Suest 1992). Therefure, for armputational
a,nvenience, we have nut wrrecteJ the stanJarJ errurs here.16
sector. For males, at mean values, non-monetary returns are higher in the formal
u:ctor Ihan in the informal sector. To make the systematic part of the indirect
utility of participation in the two sectors equal, a formal sector wage offer of only
0.46 (std err: 0.04) times that of the informal sector is needed. The additional
security and benefits may cause males to value participation in the formal sector
higher. For females the opposite holds, there a formal wage offer of 1.18 (std err:
0.11) times that of the informal sector is needed to equalize probabilities.
To obtain insight into the effects of the wages on the sector preference we have
drawn ligures I and 2. The figures show the probability a sector is preferred as a
function of the wage offer. The figures are ceteris paribus, calculated at the mean
valuc of Ihe cxogcnous variablcs. The wage offer in one sector is varied, the wage
offer in the other sector is held constant at the sample mean. For males, the effect
of a change in the wage offer is mostly a substitution effect between sectors. Since
not-working is seldom the preferred status an increase in the wage offer in one
sector reduces the prohability that the other sector is the preferred one. For females
Ihr cllcrls ;irc dilfcrcnt. I~ur Ihcin ;cn incrcaxc in lhc wagc ufl~cr incrc;tscs lhc
probability of preference for thal sector at the cost of not working. At the mean
value the log wage offers are for males and females (in parentheses) respectively:
0.62 (-0.38) in the formal sector and -0.14 (-1.06) in the informal sector. The
own wage elasticities (relative change of probability of participation over a relative
change in the wage offer) are 0.21 (1.35) for the formal sector and l.19 (l.34) for
the informal sector. The cross elasticities are -0.17 (-0.l5) for the effect of the
informal wage offer on the participation in the formal sector and -1.12 (-0.26) for
the reverse.
The estimates for the wage equations are presented in table A2. Ceteris paribus,
males reach their highest earnings at 4S years in the formal sector and a[ 48 years
in the informal sector. For females the peaks are at 40 and 46 respectively. The
variables "inter" through "missed years" show the effect of education on earnings.
"Basic", which is the lowest education level, is the excluded reference category.
For males, returns to education are higher in the formal sector than in the informal
sector. "Normal" education, which is a training for primary school teachers, only
has positive returns in the formal sector. For females, education only has positive
returns in the formal sector. [n the informal sector only intermediate education has
positive return. For some categories, such as "normal" and "university" even a
significant negative return is estimated. Returns to education in the formal sector
arc higher for females than for males. For both males and females, the estimates
are confonn the segmented labour market hypothesis. We do allow the error terms
of the wage equations to be correlated with the rationing equations. Whether such a
correlation should be included for the infonnal sector is not obvious. In this sector
it is less likely that there are unobserved factors which are used as rationing
devices that influence productivity in the informal sector. For males, this
correlation is not significantly different from zero at the S~Io level. For females it17
is. The correlation between the formal sector wage equation and the rationing
equation is positive and significant for both sexes. This indicates that overpaid (as a
result of strong collective bargaining, for example) formal sector workers (good
and bad) have a higher probability of being rationed.
The local unemployment rate has a significant negative effect on earnings in the
informal sector. The effect is the strongest for males. In the formal sector, neither
for tnales nor for females, a significant effect of unemployment can be detected.
Belonging to an ethnic group significantly lowers the returns in the formal sector
for males. For females, a positive effect of ethnicity is found in the informal
sector. A possible explanation is that informal sector activity of females is largely
concentrated in the commerce and restaurants sector (824b). In that sector a
positive discrimination of ethnicity for females may exist.
Table A3 presents the estimate for r, the ccefficient in the equation (2) that relates
the good and bad fonnal wage offer. For males the difference is the greatest for
higher technical education and university level training. For nonnal education the
wage difference is relatively small. For females the effects are smaller. Only the
local unemployment rate and the normal and university education variables have a
sil;nilic;nrt ulTcct. This indicatcs Ih;tt tmdcrpayment is not a primary motive for
search fur females. Their search activity in the (bad) formal sector may be more
correlated with other, non-wage job characteristics. A likelihood ratio test rejected
the null hypothesis that the wage differential, r, dces not depend on covariates for
both sexes at the 5~ level.'
Table A4 presents the estimates for the rationing equation for good fonnal sector
johs. A high~r valuc of thc Icft h:tnd sidc variable is associated with an increased
probability of rationing. The probability of rationing decreases with the level of
education. This result holds for both males and females. This suggests that formal
education is used as a screening device for formal sector jobs. A higher local
unemployment rate increases the rationing level, as expected. Belonging to an
ethnic group significantly increases rationing for females, for males the effect is
much smaller. We experimented with incorporating information on migration into
the rationing equation. For 2 out of 8 regions we have information about how long
ago the individual moved to the place he currently lives. In a Hams-Todaro type
migration model, migrants work for a while in the informal sector while they
queue up for formal sector jobs. Therefore we would expect the probability of
rationing to increase if the individual moved in more recently. We could not find
'As nut~l, h can hc testcxl whuthcr "g~Nxl" ;md "haJ" Girmal juhs JitÏer with taste shiRerx (~
as well. An LM tw~t rejcx;ted the null Hyputhesis that gixxl and baJ tiirmal johs only ditfer in the
wage uffer as is ascumed in the mixlel at the 596 level. Estimating the mixlel, allowing for the
effect uf tacte shifters, caus~ adtlitional cumplexities a,e the likelihaid may not be defined for
sume indiviJuals, since the utility of had johx might exceed that of gcxxl formal sectur jobs.(8
any significant effect of these variables. Because we only have the migration
information for two capital cities we decided not to include the migration variables
in the presentation of the results.
Rationing can be viewed as an indicator for labour market segmentation. As is
clear from the estimates, the degree of rationing varies strongly over individuals
with different observed characteristics. It is therefore not possible to give a simple
yeslno answer to whether there is labour market segmentation between the formal
and informal sector in Bolivia. In table 4 we have calculated the probability of
rationing for some standard individuals. For all individuals the probability of
rationing is significantly different from zero which would suggest that the
hypothesis of no labour market segmentation is rejected. The conclusions need not
be that strong, however. If one believes in a natural rate of (frictional) search, one
would test whether the predicted probability is significantly different from the
natural search rate. Note that labour market segmentation as defined in this model
only refers to the rationing of "good" formal sector jobs.
Table 4. Preciicted probability of rationing for standard individuals
(percentages, standard error in parentheses, base: age-30, missed years-0, econ
active and unempl at mean value)
mala, femalra
r.Jucatiun Cthnic
intar no 33.2 34.1
(1.98) (3.88)
hight~x:h no 27.2 18.03
(4.12) (4.23)
univenity no 20.0 21.3
(1.6G) (2.62)
intrr yes 37.4 44.3
(2.25) (4.75)
The goodness of fit of the model can be examined by comparing the predicted
probabilities of participation with the observed outcomes. The first 4 columns of
tablcs 5 and 6 present the results for males and females. Predicted probabilities
were obtained by simulation, taking multiple (50) draws from the estimated error
distribution for each individual. The preferred status can be obtained by solely
taking into consideration the predicted utilities of participation in a sector, setting
the probability of rationing to zero. In general the predicted numbers are relatively
close to the observed. For males, the model underestimates the number of
individuals for whom the preferred sector is the formal sector at the cost of the
number of individuals for whom not working is the preferred status. For females,
the number of individuals who prefer not to work is underestimated. Overall the fit
is reasonable.19
T bl . Males: Goodness of fit and simulation (number of individuals)
Ohservacl Predictui Unempl t596
Actual Profernxi Actual Prefcrred Actual Proferrrd
Formal gixxl 2973 4783 2782 4625 2088 4921
Fonnal haJ 732 936 1275
Informal 1763 1247 1780 121r4 1462 837
Not working 881 319 850 4ti0 1523 591
T bl Females: Goodness of fit and simulation (number of individuals)
OhscrveJ Prixiictacl UnCmpl t596
Actual Preferttid Actual Proferred Actual Preferred
Form:d g~wxl 1265 2280 1277 2281 765 2210
Furm:d h:~d 229 2G4 202
Informal 1917 1568 1859 1674 1532 1324
No1 wurking 3882 3445 3893 3338 4794 3759
The last two columns in table 5 and 6 present the results of a simulation exercise.
We have simulated the effect of an exogenous increase in the rate of unemployment
by 5 percent on sector participation and preferences. The results should be
compared with the predictions from the base case (column 3 and 4). The effect of
an increase in unemployment works in several ways. First, it has a negative effect
on earnings in both sectors, thereby making non-participation more attractive.
Second, the probability of rationing for "good" formal sector jobs increases. The
combined effect is rather different for males and females. For males, formal sector
preference increases even though the effect of unemployment on formal sector
wages is negative. For only 2Io of the males the preferred sector changes from
working to non-working. Because the probability of rationing increases not all of
the workers end up working in the "good" formal sector. All effects considered,
"good" formal and informal sector participation decrease and the participation in
the other sectors increase. For females, the effect of an increase of unemployment
is clearly a move out of employment towards non-participation. Both the
"preferred" as well as the "actual" numbers decrease for both sectors. The
simulation shows that females labour supply is more sensitive to labour market
conditions than thal of inen.
7. Cuncludin~ remarks
Labour supply in urban areas of a developing country has been analyzed using a
model that explicitly incorporates rationing for formal sector jobs. Information on
search, including on-the-job search, allows us to disentangle the effects of sector20
preference and rationing in the model. The informal sector is taken as a free entry
scclur. "1'hc t~st of lahour markel segmcntation that follows is thus a test for
rationing of formal scctur jobs, and not a test for wage differences between sectors,
as is common in the literature. The model corrects for endogenous selection into
sectors and treats earnings in all sectors as endogenous. The model is estimated on
cross section data stemming from a Bolivian household survey. !n general,
estimation results are in line with the segmented labour market hypothesis.
Rationing is treated as a heterogeneous phenomenon in the model. The results show
that the probability of rationing decreases with additional education. Conclusions on
whether labour market segmentation is present vary with observed characteristics of
the individual. Ethnicity has a significant positive effect on the probability of
rationing for both males and females. The effect is the largest for females.
Regional variation is exploited to estimate demand side effects on earnings and
participation. Larger labour markets increase the probability of rationing for males.
Unemployment has a positive effect on rationing for both sexes.
Policy simulation exercises can be done to investigate the effect of a change in
exogenous variables on earnings and participation in sectors. The structure of the
model has the advantage that the effects resulting from changes in preferences,
wages and rationing can be analyzed separately. For males, exogenous shocks
mostly inFluence the choice between formal and informal sector participation and
not so much the choice of whether to work or not. For females, on the contrary,
the move is more in and out of employment. Policy simulation should be treated
cautiously as demand side effects are modelled rather parsimoniously.21
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Appendix I. List of variables
Individual level variahl~
married dummy - I if individual is married
ethnic dummy - I if the inclividual regularly speaks other than spanish
active search if the individual reixirtrtl to be seazching for work in the last week.
diccouragexl if the individual repemexf rnit to he looking for work because "there is no
work"
hourly earnings calculateil as total earnings divided through the number of hours worked
Educatiun variahles
variable dummi~ d~cription number of years
of education at completion
Basic incluJ~ no eduwtion anJ hasic education
inter intermetliate education 8
mcxlio 12
midte~:h vucational treining 13
hightech ~5
nurmal primary schiN~l teacher treining 17
university university ht~th private anJ puhlic 20
ulhcr non-calcgurii~s, ti~r malcs pruhahly largcly
military training
missed years if individual Jid nut uimplete training:
minus number of years hetirce aimpletion
HuusehulJ level variahles
net pc Jissavings tutal household consumptiun minus total household inwme divided by
family size
yuung numher huusehulJ memhers ut' less than 15 years old
prime numher uf huusehuld memhers hetween IS and 65
old number uf huusehold memhers greater than 65 years old
Regional variahle,e
unempluyment share uf IaM~ur force unemployed per urhan center
ecun a~1 number uf wurking ur searching individuals in the sample per urhan center23




































































fornul vs nonyart informsl vs non-part
qd ert pmmeter nd ert psruntter qd err
0.396 -0.421 0.306 -1.499 0.373
0.019 0.101 0.016 0.123 0.017
0.0?3 -0.160 0.021 -0.134 0.020
0.018 -0.007 0.014 -0.032 0.016
0.019 -0.045 0.013 -0.117 0.016
0.086 -0.029 0.062 -0.091 0.080
p.225 -1.812 0.14J -0.624 O.I81
0.699 -1.316 0.462 ~.804 0.680
0.675 1.162 0.478 1.211 0.679
0.006 0.021 0.004 0.002 0.004
0.201 0.821 0.066 I.251 0.1? 1
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ahlC A3. Tau e..tinwtc~liffrruncn c~twixn gixxl a~xl had tiirmal xxtor wage
malnr: fumal~a
pantt~etcr aW arc parametw sW err
cn~t 0.241 0.175 0.163 0.350
age 0.016 0.008 -0.007 0.017
egC squartxlllOO -0.020 O.U10 U.004 0.023
intor 0.005 0.047 -0.026 0.103
malio 0.054 0.040 -0.Q24 0.080
miJteah 0.122 0.077 0.119 0.119
hight.xh 0.251 0.084 -0.OSI 0.196
normal -0.348 O.119 -0.368 0.144
univer~ity 0.236 0.045 0.156 0.090
oth~r 0.053 0.079 0.142 0.117
micvxl yra~rn 0.022 0.01 I -0.012 0.021
econ actll0 0.006 0.022 -0.044 0.041
unnmpluym~nt ~10 0.116 0.091 0.622 0.189
ethnic -0.059 0.032 0.071 0.063
ahlr A4. Rationing eyuatiuna
mal~ females
prnmetrr xtJ urc panmrtcr sUl crt
cnnt -0.072 0.241 0.680 0.377
asC -0.060 U.OIU -0.078 0.017
agC xluareJl100 0.068 0.013 0.076 0.023
intcr -0.117 0.061 -0.3tí0 0.107
mcxl{o -0.180 0.052 -0.435 0.091
miJt`x:h -0.213 0.102 -0.752 0.126
hightnch -0.289 0.130 -0.865 0.177
normal -0.378 0.099 -0.689 0.109
univCnity -0.523 0.065 -0.748 0.111
iNhcr -0.330 0.101 O.185 0.129
mia.rJ year. -0.047 0.015 -0.061 0.024
exim act I10 0.103 0.030 0.001 0.043
un~m~loymctu '10 0.933 0.122 1.122 0.177
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